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1 Introduction
Ever since the publication of Peter Singer’s article ‘‘Famine, Affluence, and
Morality’’ has the question of whether the (geographical) distance to people in need
affects our moral duties towards them been a hotly debated issue.1 Does
geographical distance affect our moral duties? If so, is it of direct moral
importance? Or is it of indirect importance to other aspects that affect our moral
duties, such as our power to help other people?
Long after the publication of Singer’s article, the relation between morality and
distance has received renewed attention in contributions by many leading
philosophers.2 While these contributions debate problems of duty and distance,
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they do so by mainly focusing on duties, such as by asking what influence distance
may have on duties, or whether specific kinds of distance, such as kinship distance,
are vital in and of themselves in establishing duties. Often, these discussions refer to
geographical distance in an offhand way, stating as obvious that it is of no moral
importance. Here, we put the concept of geographical distance at the center of the
analysis. We ask: what precisely is the definition and role of geographical distance
in the different accounts of duties? We argue that a distinction between empirical
and moral disagreement over the role of geographical distance clarifies several
aspects of the debate about duty and distance. Most strikingly, several points of
contention are empirical rather than moral disagreements about the role of
geographical distance. This insight does not only allow us to re-assess the existing
literature, but it also opens up new avenues for action and sheds light on discussion
about duties towards refugees arriving at European shores, or so we argue.
Our main objective is to clarify the debate on the role of distance and moral
duties by focusing on the definition and role of geographical distance. Our
strategy is as follows. We first revisit and restate Singer’s claim that ‘‘distance
does not matter’’ in more precise terms in order to spell out the (often implicit)
assumptions that have to hold for distance not to matter to a person’s duties. This
restatement allows us to distinguish between different notions of distance that
can influence a person’s duties to others in different ways. To be more precise,
we illustrate how geographical distance can have an empirical and a moral
importance for one’s duties. We then show that many differences between Singer
and his critics concerning distance are of empirical, rather than moral, nature.
Furthermore, we provide one framework within which one can locate several
hitherto unconnected discussions about duty and distance, and compare different
accounts that have been put forward in either of these discussions. The
perspective we advance also raises challenging new questions, for instance: what
kind of (empirical) understanding of the role of distance do we base our moral
claims on? We present a framework that makes clear what kinds of choices both
theorists and policy makers face when confronted with this question. We
delineate the space within which policy makers can influence (e.g. decrease) the
impact of geographical distance on our moral duties, and show how this
perspective can help in discussing policy reforms and that it sheds new light on
duties in the current refugee crisis.
Footnote 2 continued
333–354; Wendy C. Hamblet, ‘‘The Geography of Goodness: Proximity’s Dilemma and The Difficulties
of Moral Response to the Distant Sufferer,’’ The Monist 86/3 (2003): 355–366; Richard Arneson,
‘‘Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality,’’ The Monist 86/3 (2003): 382–401; Jan Narveson, ‘‘We
Don’t Owe Them a Thing! A Tough-minded but Soft-hearted View of Aid to the Far Away Needy,’’ The
Monist 86/3 (2003): 419–433. See also Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and
the Distant Needy, Cambridge (2004): Cambridge University Press; and earlier contributions by Frances
Kamm, ‘‘Does Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?,’’ Law and Philosophy 19 (2000):
655–681; Violetta Igneski, ‘‘Distance, Determinacy and the Duty to Aid: A Reply to Kamm,’’ Law and
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Inquiry 42 (2008): 1–21.
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2 Singer’s Distance Claim Restated
Recent debates about duty and distance start with Singer’s 1972 article. There, he
offers the following radical stance: ‘‘[…] if it is in our power to prevent something
very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’’3 One’s duty to help, Singer goes on to
argue, is established independently from distance. Saving a child from drowning in
a nearby pond is a duty, and so is saving a child from starving in a faraway country.
That one of these children is more distant is simply not relevant in determining the
respective duties in these cases. Indeed, Singer explicitly states: ‘‘[…] the principle
takes […] no account of proximity or distance.’’4
In the utilitarian framework Singer employs, this claim leads to the conclusion
that every person has a duty to prevent harm from (distant) others, say in case of
poverty or famines, until the marginal utility of the last unit she gives up equals the
marginal utility gain her sacrifice brings about. This radical stance has led to intense
debates. There have been a number of critical contributions that examine Singer’s
general project.5 Singer himself has been expanding on his earlier work in a number
of contributions, further developing the practical implications of his view, also by
ultimately connecting it to the idea of philanthropy and ‘‘effective altruism.’’6 Some
contributions have also discussed whether distance affects one’s duty to help (and if
so, how) and how far-reaching those duties should be.7 In this paper, we focus on
analyzing the role of the concept of distance in Singer’s claim: that distance is
irrelevant to discern a person’s duties to (distant) others. Singer says: ‘‘I do not think
I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and distance into
account.’’8 We disagree. Rather, claims about the (ir)relevance of distance need as
much careful attention as other parts of Singer’s radical stance, as attested by the
discussions about distance and duties.9
Let us now take a closer look at the ‘‘Distance does not matter!’’ slogan. Firstly,
Singer is obviously referring to geographical distance in stating it. That is, he is not
concerned with other kinds of distances such as emotional, kinship, temporal,
cultural, linguistic, or causal distance, but rather focuses on geographical distance.10
Secondly, Singer is concerned with those features of a situation that are of direct
3 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit., p. 231.
4 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit., p. 231.
5 See, for instance, Patricia Illingworth; Thomas Pogge, and Leif Wenar (eds), Giving Well: The Ethics of
Philanthropy, Oxford (2010): Oxford University Press.
6 Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save, Random House (2009); Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and
Morality. Oxford (2009): Oxford University Press.
7 For a discussion of the radical stance, see for instance Deen Chatterjee (2004, op. cit.) and Rivka
Weinberg, ‘‘It Ain’t My World,’’ Utilitas 21 (2009): 144–162.
8 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit., p. 232.
9 cf. the literature referred to in Footnote 2.
10 Obviously, Singer’s claim entails the irrelevance of other dimensions of distance, such as ties of
kinship to the person in need. For a more specific discussion of these, see Peter Singer, ‘‘Outsiders: our
obligations to those beyond our borders,’’ in: D.K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 11–32.
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moral relevance to identify one’s duties to others: it should be ‘‘in our power to
prevent something very bad from happening’’ without us having to sacrifice
‘‘anything of comparable moral importance.’’11 Of course, this leaves open the
possibility that geographical distance affects our duties indirectly by, for instance,
affecting our power to help. Singer shortly discusses this possibility, i.e. that being
far away in geographical distance could mean that one is also (i) less effective in
helping, (ii) less acquainted with people who are far away, (iii) less well informed
about the situation.12 However, Singer maintains in passing that these effects are not
relevant anymore in the ‘‘global village.’’ Instant communication and direct
connections made geographical distance (also indirectly) irrelevant to a person’s
duties.
Yet, this way to dismiss any influence of geographical distance upon one’s moral
duties seems a bit too quick. We need to ask how concepts like effectiveness (or
power) to help and knowledge about victims can be delineated from a purely
geographical understanding of distance. In order to provide an account that allows
one to answer this question, we will go through three kinds of objections that
Singer’s claim could be subjected to and offer restatements of it that accommodate
them. The first two objections deal with (i) and the third objection deals with both
(ii) and (iii).
Firstly, consider the following objection against Singer’s claim: if it is both the
case that power to help matters and that the concept of power to help is dependent
upon geographical distance, then geographical distance does matter after all. Now, it
is clear that the power to do or prevent something really does matter for Singer, as it
is explicitly mentioned in his radical stance that we cited earlier. It also seems
plausible that in order to understand how an agent might be powerful, one needs to
have an account of how an agent can make a difference across a certain
geographical distance. For instance, in order to have the power to prevent a child
from drowning, an agent should be able to make a difference in physically reaching
that child, either by using her arms to save the child herself, or by instructing
another agent or a machine, for instance.13 We are not contending here that small
geographical distance is required to be powerful. Rather, to be powerful in Singer’s
context means to be able to make a difference (across geographical distance). In and
of itself, that is not an objection against Singer. It only brings an implicit assumption
underlying Singers notion of power to help into the open: in his view, power is not
conceptually related to geographical distance. To see why this is important, consider
the following. If we would couple Singer’s distance slogan with the statement ‘‘to
be powerful means to be able to save everyone from drowning who is five steps or
less away,’’ then the concept of power to help hinges on a specific understanding of
distance such that it becomes a contradiction to also maintain that geographical
distance does not matter. As long as the understanding of how an agent might be
powerful is not dependent upon geographical distance, there is no problem for
11 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit., p. 231.
12 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit., p. 231, 232.
13 Frances Kamm (op. cit.) discusses geographical distance and effectiveness in similar terms, to which
we return in the next section.
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Singer to maintain his distance claim. Hence, in order to account for this point,
Singer is required to use a concept of power in the radical stance that does not
contradict the distance claim. The first part of our restatement ensures exactly that.
Singer Restated I. Geographical distance does not matter, if the concept of
power to help is not derived from a specific notion of geographical distance.
Secondly, one might object that the above provision is not enough. It could still
be the case that power is correlated to geographical distance, such that the latter
does matter after all. That is, even if the power concept is not directly established by
reference to geographical distance (such as in the example offered when discussing
the first objection above), there could still be a correlation between power and
geographical distance, i.e. the nearer a victim is to an agent in a geographical sense,
the more powerful that agent is to help. If that were the case, then the notion of
being in a position to help effectively would contradict the claim that geographical
distance does not matter. The amended restatement of the claim avoids precisely
this kind of problem.
Singer Restated II. Geographical distance does not matter, if the concept of
power to help does not presuppose a specific notion of distance, and
geographical distance and power to help are not correlated.
Thirdly, one may object that one’s ability to know about the potential of
something bad to happen is correlated with geographical distance. If that is true,
then geographical distance matters after all. For instance, one could contend that
events or circumstances that are geographically distant are harder to access
epistemically than geographically near ones. The third and final restatement avoids
this problem.
Singer Restated III. Geographical distance does not matter, if the concept of
power to help does not presuppose a specific notion of geographical distance,
geographical distance and power are not correlated, and one’s ability to know
about the potential of something bad to happen is not correlated with
geographical distance.
The restatement does reflect (part of) the provisions that are in Singer’s original
article14: it simply combines the claim and the three provisions concerning
(i) efficacy of helping, and (ii) & (iii) knowledge about victims and their situation.
We would like to stress here that the restatement exercise is merely meant to make
more explicit what is already inherent in Singer’s original formulation of the radical
stance and the distance claim. That is, we do not mean to offer an interpretation of
Singer here, but rather summarize concisely what he has to say about distance and
the assumptions his radical stance is based upon. With this restatement in place, a
number of misunderstandings about and objections against Singer’s geographical
distance claim can be avoided.
Before we discuss these in greater detail in the next section, we comment on the
different ways in which geographical distance could influence one’s duties, and how
14 Frances Kamm, op. cit.
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they are ruled out by restatements I, II and III, respectively. Restatement I rules out
a conceptual relationship between geographical distance and a variable that is of
primary moral importance.
Such variables can be the power one has to help others, but it might also be one’s
commitments to others or one’s ties of friendship. If geographical distance is
conceptually linked to such a factor of primary moral importance, we take
geographical distance itself to be of moral importance. Different to that,
restatements II and III rule out an empirical correlation between geographical
distance and morally relevant factors, such as one’s effectiveness to help or the
informational requirements necessary to do so. Whether geographical distance
matters here cannot be decided a priori but is dependent on facts about the world. As
we shall argue in the next section, much of the disagreement between Singer and his
critics is ultimately concerned with such empirical questions about the relevance of
distance, rather than the moral importance of distance itself.
3 Implications of the Restatement for Debates about Morality
and Distance
Why is the restatement of Singer’s claim important? There are two main reasons.
For one, it makes the assumptions about the relationship between geographical
distance and the morally relevant features Singer defends in his claim explicit. What
is more, it helps to analyze contributions that have criticized Singer’s position or
seem to stand opposite to it, contending that distance matters. We now investigate in
how far the restated claim sheds new light on these critical contributions.
The contributions can be divided into two broad categories: firstly, those
contributions who purportedly disagree with Singer, but for which the restatement
shows that the disagreement is about one or more of the implicit assumptions
underlying Singer’s stance, which we brought out in the restatement. Secondly,
there are contributions that would demand further additions to the restated Singer
claim in order to be compatible with it. We will go through each type of
contribution in turn.
There are a number of accounts that can be accommodated with the restatement.
The most prominent one is the article by Frances Kamm who maintains: ‘‘there are
cases in which geographical distance matters.’’15 However, she qualifies this by
saying that it is the distance between the ‘‘extended parts’’ of an agent and the threat
to a victim or the victim themselves that counts. She illustrates this by means of an
example in which different kinds of proximity and distance play a key role:
‘‘Suppose I stand in a part of France, but I have very long arms that reach all the way
to the other part of France, […] allowing me to reach a child drowning in a pond at a
distance […]. Intuitively, I think this case is treated as one where the child is
near.’’16
15 Frances Kamm, op. cit.
16 Frances Kamm, op. cit., p. 662, emphasis in the original.
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In this example (and other examples that she discusses in her article, in similar
vein), she is not referring to pure geographical distance, but rather to an account in
which the ability or power to help is correlated with geographical distance.
Furthermore, Kamm discusses examples in which she alludes, albeit indirectly, to
epistemic and emotional factors that can be correlated to geographical distance.17
Hence, in light of the previous discussions, we maintain that Kamm’s position
seems to be mainly in conflict with the idea, expressed in the second restatement of
Singer’s distance claim, that power is not to be correlated with geographical
distance.
This nuance in the disagreement between Kamm and Singer is crucial. Indeed,
the disagreement is an empirical one rather than a moral one. Both of them agree
that geographical distance does not matter itself for establishing duties. However,
they disagree about whether variables that are of primary moral importance, such as
the ability or power to help, can be disentangled from geographical distance or not.
Singer explicitly says that geographical distance does not affect our power to avoid
something bad from happening in the modern world.18 Kamm discusses cases in
which geographical distance can affect one’s power to intervene.19 That, however,
is an empirical (rather than moral) disagreement between Singer and Kamm, about
whether the conditions of the restated distance claim hold: are power and
geographical distance correlated or not? Depending on how we sort out this
empirical question decides upon whether Kamm’s and Singer’s position are
reconcilable or not: there is no moral disagreement between these two authors. They
agree that geographical distance as such is not of primary moral importance. What
they disagree about is an empirical question, namely whether we live in a world in
which geographical distance does affect parameters that are of moral importance,
such as our power to help others.
It could be argued that Singer’s distance claim is rather heroic empirically: power
to rescue and the ability to know about rescuing seem to be closely correlated to
geographical distance in the majority of cases. While it is also relatively easy to find
examples in which they are not, it seems that by and large geographical distance to
the victim is often either correlated or at least a good indicator of how much power
and knowledge an agent may have to intervene.20 One can agree with Singer that the
correlation between one’s power to avoid something bad from happening and
geographical distance decreased with the globalized world moving closer together
in the recent decades. However, the question whether this correlation has ceased to
exist and thus that geographical distance is (empirically) irrelevant for one’s power
to help can be questioned, as Kamm did. As we will discuss below, it is within the
scope of public policy, however, to further decrease the importance of geographical
distance for one’s ability to help, bringing our actual world closer to the world in
which Singer’s radical stance that geographical distance does not matter at all holds
true. We will pick up this question once again in sections 4 and 5.
17 Frances Kamm, op. cit., p. 663f.
18 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit.
19 Frances Kamm, op. cit.
20 Violetta Igneski (op. cit.) demonstrates this in detail.
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A second type of criticism against Singer’s distance claim goes beyond aspects
that can be dealt within the restatement. Rather, this second type of criticism can
only be dealt with when adding further conditions to the restatement. We see this as
an advantage of the methodology adopted in this paper: the restatement simply
reflects a summary of Singer’s views on distance, while at the same time serving as
a baseline position that can be criticized or expanded upon and thereby allows
making the differences between Singer and his critics more explicit.
Additions to the restatement come in the form of providing arguments for the
moral relevance of other variables, which often can be expressed as the relevance of
other notions of distance. For example, Miller argues that co-nationals have special
duties towards each other.21 That is, he maintains that there is an important sense in
which citizens of the same country are less distant to each other and that this is
morally relevant. Unger argues a similar point by employing the concept of
psychological (or emotional) distance.22 Likewise, Arneson, as well as Reader
conceptualize special ties and relationships in this way.23 In order to accommodate
these kinds of positions about how different kinds of distance can be morally
relevant, they could be added to the restatement of Singer. That is, if any of the
above authors would like to endorse Singer’s claim about the irrelevance of
geographical distance, they would need to uphold that the respective dimension of
distance for which they claim moral importance, such as citizenship, psychological
or emotional distance, is not conceptually related or empirically correlated to
geographical distance. The restatement would need to be further amended to reflect
such a position.
Crucially, the above debates (and possible additions to the restatement that they
might imply) are of a different type than the ones discussed before. The disagreement
here lies in whether the different kinds of distance that are evoked by the authors, such
as kinship distance, are of direct moral importance in establishing one’s duties. As
such, the additional conditions to the restatement the above positions would require
(for geographical distance not to matter) are considerably stronger: not only are such
kinds of distances required to be of direct moral importance in establishing one’s
duties, but they are also required not to be constitutive of or correlated to geographical
distance. If one defends a pronounced view on how a specific kind of distance is of
direct moral importance in establishing one’s duties, it is not straightforward whether
and how Singer’s stance about the irrelevance of geographical distance can be
maintained. In section 5, we will discuss one such case where proximity of refugees
can establish a specific duty towards them.
What is the upshot of this discussion regarding the restatement of Singer and the
debates about distance and duty? It seems to us that both Singer and other
commentators underestimate the fact that geographical distance can be related in
various ways to factors that are morally relevant in discerning one’s duties to others.
21 David Miller, ‘‘The Ethical Significance of Nationality,’’ Ethics 98 (1988): 647–662.
22 Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
23 See Richard Arneson (op. cit.) and Soran Reader, ‘‘Distance, Relationship and Moral Obligation,’’ The
Monist 86/3 (2003): 367–381.
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These factors can be of primary moral importance, as those explicitly stated by
Singer, like the power one has to avoid something bad from happening.
Alternatively, such morally relevant factors can be other dimensions of distance,
such as cognitive or epistemic distance, for instance. Even though there seems to be
broad agreement between Singer and his critics that geographical distance should
not be of direct moral relevance to one’s duties, they disagree about the (empirical)
relationship between geographical distance and those factors that are of direct moral
importance to establish one’s duties to others.24
Apart from clarifying the debate and identifying the precise points of disagreement
between the various camps of the debate, the insights generated here have also
implications for how policy can (and possibly should) affect people’s duties towards
each other by influencing the empirical relationship between geographical distance
and morally relevant parameters. We now turn to these implications.
4 Implications of the Restatement for Public Policy
As argued in the previous section, much of the debate about the importance of
geographical distance is about an empirical question: are those factors that are of direct
moral relevance to one’s duties correlated to geographical distance? Singer claims that
even though this might have been the case in earlier times, this correlation does not
hold in a globalized world. Others hold that the correlation is still there to such an
extent that it can result in a decrease of one’s moral duties to distant others.
Irrespective of the stance one takes in this debate, the point both sides seem to
agree upon is that technological and other developments can decrease the influence
of geographical distance on morally relevant factors, such as one’s power to avoid
something bad from happening in a geographically distant place. This insight allows
us to see existing practices in international organizations from a new perspective
and furthermore to identify future policies that reduce the diminishing effect of
geographical distance on one’s duties.
First, it allows us to see some of the prevailing and current trends in development
and aid of the poor in new light. Consider for instance the widespread practice by
development organizations (such as Worldvision, Save the Children, and UNICEF)
to offer potential donors to be a sponsor to a child. Clearly, on the account
developed here, we can characterize this practice as a way to disentangle
geographical distance between Western donors and children in Africa and Asia
from variables that are morally relevant to establish our duty, such as knowledge
about the help needed25: while the children that can be sponsored are geographically
24 Indeed, Violetta Igneski (op. cit.) holds that geographical distance is a (empirically relevant) proxy for
morally relevant aspects.
25 Note that this question as to how policy can influence a person’s moral duty to those who live far away
is different from the question how policy can influence a person’s willingness to comply with those
duties. The later question entered the debate as to whether Singer’s radical stance is overly demanding.
The field of moral psychology revealed important insights about the tension between the common
acceptance that ‘‘geographical distance should not matter’’ versus the intuition that most people care more
about what is less distant to them on a variety of dimensions, such as emotion, kinship, culture, language,
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distant, they are brought closer to potential sponsors in other ways. That is, these
measures presuppose that with geographical distance, there is inferior knowledge
about help needed, and are designed to overcome it. Other measures, such as
appeals to donate for the victims of natural disasters, can be characterized in similar
fashion.
Second, the insight that a crucial question is an empirical rather than a moral one
opens up new challenges for policy making. (How) is it possible to reduce the
dependence of morally relevant factors (such as the power to intervene) on the
geographical distance between the people in need and the (potential) duty bearer?
As Singer pointed out, much has changed in recent years due to technological
development that allows one to get information about most parts of the world in an
instant and take immediate and effective action. Nevertheless, even though one’s
possibilities to inform oneself and the effectiveness of taking action around the
globe increased in the last decades, many would argue that geographical distance is
still negatively affecting one’s power to intervene. However, there is scope for
future policies to change this. For example, information about places where support
is needed in the world could be spread much more systematically. Similarly, one’s
power to intervene over a distance could be further increased by establishing
respective networks even before the help is in fact required.
As we write this article, in 2016, there are many migrants from countries in the
Middle East and Africa who have come to Europe, seeking refuge, asylum, or
opportunity. Given the numbers of migrants concerned, especially the numbers of
those seeking asylum, and given how the situation unfolded in the years of 2015 and
2016, the current situation can be described as Europe’s largest refugee crisis post
WWII. Singer’s article was also written under the impression of a refugee crisis, but
one that occurred in geographical distance to Western countries.26 This time, the
situation is different: refugees and other migrants have all but nullified the
geographical distance to Western countries, either by arriving in Western countries,
or in countries that are geographically close to them.
The current refugee crisis in Europe clearly presents a humanitarian and political
challenge to the European Union, as well as a moral challenge to all European
citizens. Long-distance migration to Europe is very risky and puts the life of those
who undertake it in danger, and many migrants suffer and die while migrating. In
terms of the discussion of geographical distance and its relation to moral duties, the
most striking feature of the crisis is that it presents a crucial twist on the kinds of
examples and situations that Singer considers27: those who have been distant people
in need to Europeans only a few months ago are now geographically close to them.
Does this reduction in geographical distance affect the duty of European citizens
towards them?
Footnote 25 continued
or history. See among others, Judith Lichtenberg, ‘‘Absence and the unfond heart: why people are less
giving than they might be,’’ in: D.K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 75–97.
26 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit.
27 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit.
C. Binder, C. Heilmann
123
One way to interpret the situation is that strangers in need have taken action to
minimize the geographical distance between them and those who can help, in order
to overcome the kinds of relations between geographical distance and the power to
help that we have discussed earlier in the restatements of Singer’s position. In
particular, minimizing geographical distance means that those who can help do not
face obstacles to use their power to help, in case that power to help is derived from
geographical distance (Singer Restated I) or correlated with it (Singer Restated II).
Moreover, in case either one of the aforementioned holds, minimizing geographical
distance also means that the ability to know for someone who has the power to help
is increased, in case that ability is correlated with geographical distance (Singer
Restated III). In a word, a migrant who comes to Europe to seek asylum thus
overcomes geographical distance to those who can help, says: ‘‘I am helping you
help me’’, to reverse a popular dictum.
Yet, can it really be said that the reduction of the geographical distance affects
the information people have about the situation of refugees and their ability to help
them? It does not seem self-evident that the reduced geographical distance does
indeed come with an increase in knowledge about the need to help or the power to
help: information about the difficult and life threatening situation of Syrians and
Iraqis could have been obtained while they were still in their home countries or in
refugee camps in Turkey or Lebanon. Similarly, in today’s interconnected world it
is relatively easy to support people in such circumstances, either institutionally by
supporting UNHRC, for instance, or individually, via NGOs. The information about
and effective power to help is not necessarily increasing due to the reduction of
geographical distance: there is very little information in the media, for instance,
about the situation in some of the main refugee camps in Europe, such as Calais in
France. In short, there are reasons to question that geographical distance is strongly
correlated with the two variables of primary moral importance (according to Singer)
and thus whether the reduction in geographical distance of refugees coming to
Europe does indeed affect the moral duties of European citizens towards them along
Singer’s account.28
While the analysis presented here highlights how our argument can be applied in
practice and how it sheds new light on the refugee crisis and its moral implications,
the observations made so far also highlight one of the main points made in this
paper: whether refugees coming to Europe and whether the reduction in
geographical distance between them and European citizens would indeed lead to
a change in duty towards them along Singer’s account, is an empirical question. Its
answer depends on the actual empirical relationship between the two variables of
primary moral importance for duties according to Singer, i.e. the knowledge about
the need for help and the power to help, and geographical distance.29 However,
could there be other morally salient variables, such as being at the border of a
country, that are dependent on geographical distance or a specific geographical
28 Note that settling the question about the relationship between geographical distance and the knowledge
about the need for help, as well the power to help is an empirical matter, as demonstrated earlier in the
paper. The claims in this paragraph are thus open to empirically informed debate.
29 Peter Singer (1972), op. cit.
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position, and strongly affect the kind of duty citizens of this country have towards
the people seeking help? We now turn to this question.
5 Distance and Duty of Europe towards Refugees
The reduction of geographical distance due to refugees moving from war-torn
countries towards or across the borders of Western states can have a more
fundamental impact on the duties Western countries have towards them: as Miller
argues, the new geographical proximity, that is, refugees arriving at the border of a
country, can establish an immediate duty of care of the respective state.30 In this
case, geographical proximity turns a general duty into a specific duty: when people
in Syria are threatened by violence and famines, then (according to Singer) in
principle all citizens of the world, who know about it and in whose power it is to
help, have a duty to help them. In this case, however, there is no duty of a specific
group of people or a specific state, say the Netherlands, to discharge the duty to a
specific Syrian citizen. However, once people stand at the borders of a state, or cross
it, it can be argued that this new geographical proximity imposes an immediate duty
of care upon the respective state, or that their presence and new geographical
location triggers new obligations towards them.31
Thus, there can be other morally salient variables, such as being at the border of a
country, that are correlated with geographical distance and strongly affect the kind
of duty citizens of this country have towards the people seeking help. One could
thus say that the refugees traveling to Europe influence another morally salient
variable32: by reaching and crossing the borders of a Western country, they ground a
specific duty the respective state (or European Union) has to them due to their new
geographical location. However, what makes a person being at the border of a
country a morally relevant factor? Miller argues that a specific obligation is created
on the side of the approached state due to the geographical location of a person in
need of assistance, more specifically her physical proximity and the state’s (unique)
capacity to assist.33 This physical proximity and the state’s capacity to assist creates
a vulnerability of the person in need of assistance in case the state that is in a unique
30 See p. 394 in David Miller, ‘‘Justice in Immigration,’’ European Journal of Political Theory 14 (2015):
391–408.
31 See David Miller (2015, op. cit.); Paulina O. Espejo, ‘‘Taking Place Seriously: Territorial Presence and
the Rights of Immigrants,’’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (2016): 67–87; Robert E. Goodin,
‘‘What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?,’’ Ethics 98 (1988): 663–686; and Jaako
Kuosmanen, ‘‘Perfecting Imperfect Duties: The Institutionalisation of a Universal Right to Asylum,’’
Journal of Political Philosophy 21/1 (2013): 24–43. Note that David Miller (2015, op. cit.) does not use
the terminology of specific and general duties. For a more detailed discussion of specific and general
duties, see Robert Goodin (op. cit.). For a defense of a universal right to asylum and a discussion of a
variety of policy schemes that discharge the corresponding duties of states, see Jaako Kuosmanen (op.
cit.).
32 See David Miller (2015, op. cit.), and Paulina Espejo (op. cit.) for a more detailed discussion of this
claim.
33 David Miller (2015), (2015, op. cit.); David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst, The Political Philosophy
of Immigration, (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2016).
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position to help does not allow them to enter. If a refusal of a state to admit refugees
at its borders can cause severe harm to them, say by exposing the person to danger at
sea, then this unique power to help (or refuse to help), creates the specific duty.34
Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the role of geographical location or
proximity for this specific obligation of one state towards people in need of
assistance is also due to the relationship between the geographical location and a
morally salient variable, i.e. its unique power to assist in this case, but not due to the
moral relevance of geographical distance itself. In this case it is a conceptual
relationship between distance and power to help (Singer Restated I): the unique
power to help is conceptually linked to the concept of a nation state, its territorial
sovereignty and the geographic location of a person in need of assistance in case she
is at the state’s borders or has crossed it.
It is important to point out that our argument does not rely on the endorsement of
this specific duty defended by Miller. What we aim to show is that even in this case
the importance of geographical location can be traced back to its relation to another
morally salient factor, namely a state’s (unique) capacity to help. Having made this
explicit, one can see that objections against Miller’s argument appear in a new light.
A possible objection to Miller’s claim is that geographical distance does not give
countries a duty that isn’t had by others.35 At first sight, it does seem dubious to
claim, for instance, that Lebanon has duties towards Syrian refugees that the United
States does not have, due to its geographical location. Similarly, claims that Greece,
Italy, or Spain have more extensive duties towards refugees arriving at their shores
than other European countries, like Germany or the Netherlands, is a hotly debated
and contested claim. At closer inspection, however, it turns out that this criticism is
again one about the relationship between geographical location and proximity and a
state’s (unique) power to help. In the case of Lebanon, many might agree that its
geographical location puts it into a unique position to help refugees fleeing on land
to neighboring countries. Lebanon has a power to assist that other countries, such as
the United States, do not have, namely to allow them to cross its borders into safety
(unless of course refugees would/could flee directly from Syria to the United States
or other states in greater geographical distance). However, beyond this immediate
act of admittance it seems questionable whether Lebanon has unique or even greater
power to help due to its geographic location. Other states, such as the United States
or European ones, might be much more powerful to help in terms of their economic
capacities, for instance. This becomes even more apparent in cases in which the
unwillingness of other states to admit refugees leads countries like Lebanon to a
situation in which its power to help itself is at risk, due to the greater number of
people it needs to assist in the light of the unwillingness of other states to assist as
well.36
34 Note that David Miller (2016, op. cit., p. 84) does not discuss the reasons for these specific obligations
created by refugees’ vulnerability in detail. The role of vulnerability in the text is our rendition of his
argument.
35 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
36 According to the UNHCR, there were more than 1 Million Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon per
mid-2016, which is more than one fifth of their total number. See also: http://data.unhcr.org/
syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122 (Accessed: October 12, 2016).
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Again, the root of the discussion as to whether geographical proximity creates
special obligations (of Lebanon in this case), is not a case of geographical proximity
itself relevant or irrelevant for a state’s duties, but rather in how far the geographical
position of a state is linked to its (possibly unique) power to help. Once this
relationship is disentangled and spelled out clearly, it becomes clear that the unique
power to help of neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, is due to their unique
position to open their borders to refugees and provide them first shelter. The overall
power to help, however, goes well beyond the admittance of people at a state’s
border to safe ground. Among others, it is crucially influenced by a state’s economic
power, a factor that is irrespective of geographical distance and creates obligations
for countries economically more powerful than Lebanon, irrespective of their
geographical distance.37
In the case of Greece and the European Union, the link between geographical
location, a country’s power to help, and its special obligations towards people in
need of assistance arriving at its borders becomes even weaker. Not only are there
many countries within and outside the European Union (such as Germany, the
Netherlands for instance), that are economically in a more powerful position to help,
but even the (unique) power of Greece to decide about admittance of the people that
arrive at its shore, is less straightforward/strong than in the case of Lebanon. In light
of the joint border control of the Schengen area of the European Union, the unique
power of Greece to admit people at its borders or at least to guide them to safe
places in order to avoid immediate harm to them can be taken as a joint
responsibility of all states of the European Union. Furthermore, one can see people
arriving at the shores of Greek islands as asking for shelter in Europe (rather than
Greece) and thus it seems difficult to sustain any special obligation of Greece due to
its geographical location due to it not having the unique power to admit refugees at
its borders (or not). Thus again the duty is not per se due to the geographical
position of a state vis-a`-vis the arriving refugees, but rather due to the relationship
between this geographical proximity and its power to help. Greece’s power to help
is not only limited economically, but also crucially influenced by the joint European
decisions about the control of Europe’s (and thus also Greece’s) borders. Once one
shifts the focus from geographical position towards a state’s power to help people in
need, it seems at least questionable whether the bearer of these (specific) duties is
the respective nation state where refugees arrive, such as Greece, or the entire
European Union.
The discussion of the current refugee crisis and the specific duties that states have
towards refugees due to their geographical location/proximity, illustrates the more
general point made in the previous sections: even in theories (such as Miller’s), that
allow for more extensive duties towards people in need of assistance that are inside
or at the borders of a state’s territory, it is not geographical location per se that
matters, but the correlation between geographical proximity and (a possibly unique)
37 It is important to note that there can be other important factors that influence a state’s duty to assist,
such as its responsibility in creating the situation for refugees to flee their country. Due to the topic of this
article, we restrict our discussion to the role of morally relevant factors that are correlated to geographical
proximity.
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position to help, that creates the specific duty of a state to help refugees arriving at
its borders.
6 Conclusions
We have pointed to two different ways in which geographical distance can matter to
a person’s duties: it can be of direct moral importance or it can be relevant due to a
correlation between some morally relevant factor and geographical distance. To
illustrate this distinction, we offered a restatement of Singer’s slogan that ‘‘distance
does not matter’’ to make explicit the qualifications he offered with regards to the
role of geographical distance for establishing duties in his 1972 paper. We used the
restatement to deflate debates about the role of distance by showing that they do not
reflect moral, but rather empirical, disagreement between Singer and his critics. The
insight that the fundamental disagreement is of an empirical nature opens up new
ways in which to think about duties in our globalized world and new questions in
how far the relevance of geographical distance to one’s duties should/can be
reduced by individual and public action. The analysis sheds new light on the duties
towards refugees currently coming to Europe and points to new possibilities for
public policy making for further disentangling geographical distance from morally
relevant factors and thus move closer to the global moral village Singer had in mind
when making his claim that geographical distance does not matter.
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